How then was Korolëv and his design team able to achieve such early and stunning success with their boosters, especially since the U.S.A. was supposed to have gained the “crème de la crème” of German rocket scientists and engineers?
The First ICBMs and the Characteristic Russian “Bundle ” Rocket
A closer glance at the first Russian ICBM, the same rocket used to launch and orbit Sputnik, with their typical “shape” distinctive of Russian boosters all the way up to the massive Proton booster, shows how. The typical Russian booster is not so much a single rocket but a “bundle” of rockets fastened around a central shaft which is itself another engine.
What’s Wrong with This Picture?
Clearly, something is wrong with this picture. The U.S.A. did get the best and brightest of Nazi rocket scientists and technology, yet, the Russians made away with scores of “middle” echelon scientists and engineers.
How then did Korolëv hit upon the brilliant and simple expedient of the “bundle” rocket?
The standard explanation is that Korolëv while on a walk in the woods around his Dacha in Moscow was inspired by the root systems of enormous trees. They suggested to him the distinctive shape and concept of the Soviet “bundle rocket” boosters.
David Percy and Mary Bennett note in "Dark Moon", that the names chosen for America’s rockets might reflect a hidden occult agenda:
"It is our contention that the codenames given to projects by the Americans reveal through word association [either intentionally or unintentionally] much about their function.
"The names of the rockets designed by Wernher von Braun at this times were the Redstone and Jupiter.
"Although the old arsenal in which he worked at Huntsville was called Redstone, it is an interesting coincidence that Mars is also the red plant.
"Jupiter, associated with war and victory, is the Roman name for the god that the Greeks called Zeus, who was the father of Apollo".
In the light of the now known state of German wartime rocketry, this cannot be anything other than an attempt to deflect attention away from the real origin of the concept,
As a simple expedient to achieve quick heavy lift capability, it is a characteristic more of a nation at war -and in a hurry- straining to achieve a swift entry to space and long-range rocket bombardment capabilities.
It is an expedient that -like the Nazi decision to pursue only a Uranium-fueled atom bomb- fits the practical requirements of Nazi Germany.
The Real Origin of the Bundle Rocket: "Projekt Zossen"
Not surprisingly, then, the real origin of the “bundle rocket” booster concept was in wartime Nazi Germany, where the idea was born in 1942 to “bundle together” five V-2 rocket engines, and fire them simultaneously, to achieve greater lift and range capability.
The plan was called “Project Zossen", a clue, perhaps, that the origin of the idea came from within the OKW’s super secret under-ground communications and command Bunker in Zossen, a suburb of Berlin.
In any case, the project was more than just a “paper project” for two designs were actually modeled and wind tunnel tests were performed on them.
This expedient had the advantage over designing, testing and building an entirely new rocket in that the V-2’s components and performance capabilities were known quantities, already tested, and in production.
And clearly Korolëv’s boosters are but a streamlined second generation version of the earlier Nazi prototype.
But was a full scale version of the rocket, or for that matter, any of the other intercontinental rocket designs the Nazis had proposed, ever tested?
SS Obergruppenführer Hans Kammlers “Evacuation” of Peenemünde and the Russian Arrival
Is there any indication that these early German ICBM “bundle rockets” or any other long-range strategic rockets went to actual construction and testing?
If so, then the logical choice was Peenemünde, for in spite of the heavy attention of Allied bombers, it was the only place presumably with facilities large enough to achieve the task.
Strange Events at an “Empty” Site
General Walter Dornberger made it clear that as early as 1939 the ultimate goal of the Peenemünde center was to create a long range rocket capable of striking New York City and other targets on the east coast of the United States.
Of course, this implies a capability to strike all of European Russia as well.
By 29 July 1940, at Peenemünde the engineer Graupe had already produced the first designs for a trans-Atlantic 2 stage rocket.
Hermann Oberth began his own formal studies for the fuel and lift requirements for such a rocket in October of 1941, as the Wehrmacht continued to liquidate the Red Army in Operation Barbarossa.
But more to the point is a letter from the Reich’s emerging “plenipotentiary for secret weapons development” SS Obergruppenführer Hans Kammler, dated October 1943, and stating that the development of the Amerikarakete continued apace.
Moreover, there exist estimates for cost, labor, and material for the "America Rocket" that strongly suggest that it had become more than a mere "paper project".
As with anything else in Kammler’s black empire of black projects, anything suggesting"labor' meant the slave labor of concentration camps, and to suggest that the project was merely a “paper project” is to diminish the human suffering that was involved in its very real flesh and blood actualization.
Another factor must be weighed.
There is a circumstantial case that the Nazis successfully tested an atom bomb ca. 10 October 1944, on the island of Rügen, or possibly some other island, standing along the German Baltic coast in the sea lanes running from Königsburg to Kiel.
This would imply that some time earlier in the summer of that year, the SS achieved some sort of breakthrough in its bomb program, perhaps finally acquiring enough critical mass to test in a bomb. In any case, the alleged Rügen test was successful, and as German researcher Friedrich Georg observes, the call then went out for "secure delivery systems".
- Friedrich George, "Star Wars 1947"
"This illustrates another facet of the German secret programs, one overlooked by most authors, namely, that unlike other countries, it appears that the Nazis gave the formal order for the development of these weapons after a test had been successfully completed. Thus, the order to 'develop' such weapons should not be taken as an order to establish the research necessary to bring them to realization, but rather as the order to bring them to production.
"It is thus noteworthy that Hitler signs the order to 'develop the atomic bomb after the alleged test in Rügen occurs. The same, in fact, could be said of the V- 2, for it is only after Hitler sees films of the rocket being successfully launched that he gives the order to develop it".
It stands to reason then, that the Amerikarakete, given this alleged atomic bomb success and actual fuel air bomb success, was much more than a "paper rocket"
By the time of its successful testing in 1944, the paper studies and wind tunnel tests were already two years old. The rocket was, in other words, on the track to actual testing and production.
All this leads us to General Kammler’s 31 January 1945 order to evacuate Peenemünde. According to the standard line, the explanation for this curious order is that the Red Army was expected to arrive at any moment. But the Red Army would not arrive at Peenemünde until 4 May.
This poses a significant question:
Was Peenemünde, as Friedrich Georg puts it, merely a "ghost town" for the three months from the evacuation order to the Russian arrival?
The order is even more curious given the fact that, since the massive British Royal Air Force raid in 1943 that all but destroyed the facility, the process had already begun of moving as much of the V-2 production to underground sites as possible.
True, the process was slow and still continuing when Kammler’s 1945 order came down, but nonetheless, it was already well under way. By early 1945 most of the V-2 production was at the massive underground factory of the notorious Mittelwerk at Nordhausen.
Thus the problem: Why give an order for something already taking place?
One late war incident suggests, and suggests quite strongly, that this was not the case, for on 9 March 1945, a British twin-engine photo-reconnaissance Mosquito fighter-bomber was chased from Peenemünde by no less than three German Messerschmitt 262 jet fighters.
Of course, one possible explanation for the British presence at the site was that they were simply trying to confirm what their Intelligence had probably already told them, namely, that Peenemünde had been evacuated.
But while that may explain the presence of the RAF Mosquito, it is not a good explanation for the -by that late date- relatively heavy presence of the Luftwaffe in the form of no less than three of its rare and valuable Messerschmitt 262 jet fighters.
Three jets just to chase an unarmed British photo-reconnaissance plane from a "ghost town"?
Clearly this makes no sense, and implies that something was still taking place at Peenemünde, something very secret and very important, something requiring all the protection the crumbling Luftwaffe could muster.
Seen in this way Kammler’s "evacuation" order of 31 January 1945 thus appears to be a clever ploy by the security-obsessed SS general, designed to throw Allied and Soviet Intelligence off the trail of whatever was still going on there.
Since most of the V-1 and V-2 teams were long gone from Peenemünde to their new underground facilities, something lse must have been going on that merited such heavy protection.
But what was it?
Fortunately, there do exist reports that during the period from March to April [and perhaps as late as May] 1945 that there were at least four tests of a large rocket named 'Thor’s Hammer" or the Amerikarakete. These reports moreover name both Peenemünde and Ohrdruf -site of the second alleged German A-bomb test on 4 March 1945- as the possible sites of these tests.
It is unlikely that Ohrdruf functioned as a test site for such a large rocket, since there was present there none of the necessary facilities to assemble and launch such a vehicle. So one is left with Peenemünde, the most likely place.
In any case, three of these tests were allegedly shots of the Amerikarakete into the Atlantic, and a fourth test was allegedly to see if orbit could be achieved!
- Georg, "Star Wars 1947".
Geoffrey Brooks corroborates the test launch of some longer-ranged version of the V-2 from the Ohrdruf region in the Harz:
"The A-9 'winged V-2' project was resurrected in 1944/45. German testimonies allege that at least one successful test launch was made from the Harz in March 1945 and in mass production this rocket could have hit London from central Germany".
- Brooks, "Hitler’s Terror Weapons".
But there is even further corroboration of mysterious goings-on at Peenemünde at the war’s end.
The “Urals Incident”
Oddly, while Peenemünde was visited only lightly by the British RAF after its massive 1943 air raid, it was visited often, and heavily, by the Soviet Red Air Force right up to the war’s end, suggesting that, if the British had fallen for Kammler’s ruse, the Soviets had not.
It is an indication that they knew something that the Allies did not. Late-war German long-range rocket activity is corroborated, in fact, by the Russians themselves.
In the Spanish language edition of the Soviet Russian science magazine "Sputnik" there is a report of the destruction in 1945 -during the war- of a Russian munitions factory in the Ural Mountains near the river Tobol.
Notably, the article ascribed the destruction to a "terror attack" of "fascist perfidy" much like "the later attacks of American B-52 bombers against the port city of Haiphong in Vietnam".
If the Russian report is accurate and not merely a typical Communist exercise in disinformation or blame-shifting for their own bureaucratic incompetence, then this most probably was a rocket attack, since by that late date in the war the Luftwaffe had little left by way of long range heavy bombers able to make the trip,
[Most of the Luftwaffe’s bombers capable of making the trip were being husbanded in Norway for an eminent operation against New York City] a trip that in any case had little prospect of success given the Red Air Force’s mastery of the skies over eastern Europe.
Only a rocket attack could guarantee success for such an operation. Given all the foregoing, it is reasonable to conclude that the Nazis may actually have been successful in testing the first strategic ballistic missiles toward the end of the war, while falling just short of getting them into production. ....or is that too, yet another dangerous myth?
If the Nazis had indeed tested such long-range rockets, successfully fired one on Soviet Russia, then this implies that yet another phase of the Amerikaraket went beyond merely being a “paper study”.
The Nazis could have tested all the long range rockets they wished, but they would have been utterly useless without a means to guide them to target. Thus, the existence of a credible long range and secure guidance system is also corroborative evidence that the Amerikarakete was not just a paper project.
The question is, did the Nazis have such means of guidance? The answer is yes, and they did not just exist on paper.
Over-the-Horizon Radars and the Amerikarakete
Successful German tests of long range rockets, much less an actual German rocket attack on Russian sites in the Urals, implies the existence of associated technologies and methods to guide such missiles accurately to their targets.
Ffrom the scientific and engineering point of view in the early 1940s, accurate guidance of such rockets was the principal problem that the Germans faced, not the actual rocket itself.
A number of methods were therefore proposed to make the Amerikarakete accurate, some technological, others less so. Given that the Amerikarakete was intended to carry “small atom bombs” and “other weapons of mass destruction,” and since the inertial guidance system of the V-2 would have been inadequate and inaccurate for attacking targets on the American east coast, the Nazis had to consider a variety of alternative modes for guidanc.
In other words, if the Amerikarakete was not a paper project, then one should expect the Germans to be working in each of the following areas:
- Technological and secure means of guiding a rocket to targets at long range; or, failing that,
- Alternative methods of guiding a rocket accurately to a target at long range;
- Technologies of miniaturizing enough rocket and/or A-bomb (or H-bomb or fuel-air bomb) components to enable a long range rocket to be able to carry such heavy payloads.
Viewed in this way, the Amerikarakete was anything but a paper project, since the Nazis considered any number of methods, from “back-pack” piloted rockets, to enable a pilot to guide the rocket to target visually before bailing out at the last minute, to actually planting a radio transponder inside the Empire State Building for a rocket to home in on, to much more sophisticated and ultimately much more secure technological means of guidance based on beam riding and radar interference.
It is this last category that is of most interest to our purposes in this book, for it is this last area of development that points very clearly to Nazi interest in, and development of, areas of physics ultimately very different than those pursued by their Allied counterparts.
The German Proto-Transistor And Television Minaturization
Before examining German accomplishments in the technology of long-range rocket guidance, it is necessary to examine their success in the equally important area of miniaturization of components. Such a step was absolutely necessary if the Third Reich was ever to be successful in wedding its atom bomb - notoriously heavy device in those days- to a rocket.
Any and every method appears to have been pursued by Kammler’s SS Sonderkommando, including techniques of boosting nuclear fission of atomic nuclei to lower the weight of the critical mass of a nuclear warhead.
But there were other successes in miniaturization. It is well known that Nazi Germany, during the infamous 1936 Berlin Olympics, successfully created the first live television broadcast of a sports event for a general public.
Television sets were placed at various locations in the Olympic village and the environs of Greater Berlin to allow the visiting athletes, tourists and German citizens to watch the games as they occurred.
Needless to say, for Dr. Josef Göbbels’ Propaganda Ministry it was a propaganda coup of the first order, and a clear demonstration to the world of German technological prowess.
During the war, however, television quickly suggested itself to the Germans as a means of visually guiding a short-range missile to target by placing a television camera in the nose of a missile.
Transmitting a picture back to an operator on the ground or in an airplane, the rocket could then be unerringly guided to target. And by war’s end, they had successfully tested the first such “smart bomb".
Obviously, placing a television camera of the size of those used in the 1936 Olympic Games inside a missile was impractical, and so the camera had to be considerably miniaturized. By the war’s end, the Germans had been hugely successful in this task, accomplishing an almost tenfold reduction in size, a small television camera and receiver set, about the size of a large shoebox.
Moreover, this miniaturization implies something enormously important, for such a tremendous reduction in size implies some sort of breakthrough in vacuum tube technology, if not in semi-conductor research itself.
The Germans made a klystron tube the same approximate size as the last knuckle and fingertip of a little finger! In short, the Germans came exceedingly close, very early in the war, by virtue of competent research in semi-conductors, to achieving the transistor, for the Allied equivalent of this little tube at the end of the war is ten times as large.
This little “proto-transistor”, dating from 1940, was used in 1941 in small radios that actually entered production for the German military, radios that were “as small as the later transistor radios of the 1950s and that also functioned with batteries".